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 Introduction 
 
In its current usage in the UK and Europe the term “social economy” refers to not-for-
profit activity geared towards meeting social needs. As such, it can be defined as 
follows by (Molloy et al, 1999: 11):  
 
“The ‘Social Economy’ constitutes a broad range of activities which have the 
potential to provide opportunities for local people and communities to engage in 
all stages of the process of local economic regeneration and job creation, from 
the identification of basic needs to the operationalisation of initiatives. The 
sector covers the economic potential and activities of the self-help and co-
operative movements, that is, initiatives that aim to satisfy social and economic 
needs of local communities and their members. This sector includes co-
operatives; self-help projects; credit unions; housing associations; partnerships; 
community enterprises and businesses. The Social Economy is the fastest 
growing sector in Europe and this context is fertile ground for the creation of 
many new enterprises locally”.  
 
The restorative powers of the social economy have come to the centre of attention in 
academic and policy debates. .  The non-profit sector, usually in the guise of the third 
sector is no longer seen as a residual and poor relation of the state or the market, a 
sphere of charity and social or moral repair.  Instead, it is imagined as a mainstay of 
future social organisation in both the developed and developing world, set to co-exist 
with or substitute for the welfare state, meet social needs in depleted and hard 
pressed communities, constitute a new economic circuit of jobs and enterprises in the 
socialised market composed of socially useful goods and services, empower the 
socially excluded by combining training and skills formation with capacity and 
confidence-building, and create a space for humane, co-operative, sustainable, and 
‘alternative’ forms of social and economic organisation.  This is, if nothing else, a 
highly impressive and ambitious set of intended achievements. There is evidence 
that, at least in part, these achievements are being realised. For example, some 
6.6% of the working population in the UK are either establishing or involved in social 
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enterprises that seek to generate income to realise community or social goals 
(Harding and Cowing, 2004).  Moreover, compared to their mainstream economy 
equivalents, these companies generate between five and six times as many jobs. 
While the optimistic proponents of the social economy have come to see much of this 
as a good thing, a ‘taming’ of capitalist excess and exploitation and the return of the 
social and civic into the mainstream, those who are more cautious and circumspect 
warn that the social economy remains a poor substitute for provision through the 
market or welfare state, the return of an under-nourished and under-nourishing 
version of “the social”. This is a more guarded assessment of the developmental 
potential of the social economy.  Either way, however, there is a distinct sense that 
the social economy will feature centrally in 21st Century capitalism. 
 
 
Methodologies and sources of evidence 
 
This paper is based on three recently completed and large-scale collaborative 
research projects carried out between 1997 and 2000 into the practices and 
experiences of social economy organisation in the UK (for fuller accounts, see Amin 
et al, 2002; Bennett et al, 2000). These projects provide the basis for a considered 
and evidence-based, account and assessment of the strengths, weaknesses and 
future potential of the social economy in the UK. The first of these projects was 
commissioned by European Commission Directorate General XII/G, sampled nearly 
2000 Third Sector initiatives, in order to select 60 examples of ‘best practice’ for 
inclusion in the Commission’s multi-country database of over 700 projects in its ‘Local 
Initiatives to Combat Social Exclusion in Europe’1.  The second project, funded by the 
UK’s Economic and Social Research Council, undertook a more critical, in-depth and 
place-based analysis of social economy practice.  Rather than investigating isolated 
examples of best practice, it sought to examine the dynamics of success and failure 
in different types of social enterprise (40 in total) in a variety of local settings in 
Bristol, Glasgow, Middlesborough and Tower Hamlets in London. .  These four areas 
were chosen to allow an exploration of the degree to which their widely differing local 
                                                          
1 The complete database can be viewed at http://locin.jrc.it. 
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civic, political and economic conditions might explain variety in the form of the social 
economy.  The third project was funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and 
examined the role of the social economy in the regeneration of former British 
coalfields, especially in Nottinghamshire and south Wales, but with some attention to 
north east England and south Yorkshire. Seeking to explore in greater depth the 
micro-scale social practices of the social economy, it deployed a mixture of in-depth 
interviews, focus groups and participant-observation in ethnographies of place  
(Bennett et al, 2000).  
 
 
Aims, objectives and contexts 
 
The paper seeks to examine the expectations – academic and policy - that have 
emerged in recent years across the developed world and the extent to which these 
have been realised, through the experience of social enterprises in these varied 
areas in the UK. Coalfields were seen as having specific combinations of the 
problematic features of both rural and urban areas, and as such as posing a 
particular challenge to regeneration policy makers (Coalfields Task Force, 1998). 
However, despite common assertions as to their homogeneous character, there are 
important differences among coalfields and this extends also to the types of social 
economy that develop there. Thus the social economy is relatively well developed in 
the valleys of the former south Wales coalfield but is much less in evidence in former 
coalfields of north east England and Nottingham. The urban areas were likewise 
chosen to span a variety of local contexts in order to allow analysis of the ‘powers of 
place’ as well as the characteristics of social economy initiatives themselves in 
explaining their effectiveness and success (or failure).  Glasgow and Middlesbrough 
represented places with similar industrial backgrounds, economic hardships and 
hierarchical political cultures (although of rather different sorts), but whereas the 
social economy is generally regarded as well developed in Glasgow, in 
Middlesbrough it is notable by its absence. The social economy is also well 
developed in Bristol and Tower Hamlets, and while these are both areas with 
ethnically and culturally diverse populations, Bristol is relatively affluent with relatively 
small pockets of poverty and social exclusion whilst Tower Hamlets has widespread 
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problems of poverty and social exclusion. How did these differences between places 
affect the nature and potential of the social economy in each location?  Whereas the 
social economy in Glasgow seemed strongly supported by the state, in Bristol and 
Tower Hamlets its dynamic seemed to lie more within a vibrant civil society. In the 
valleys of south Wales, the social economy has in some respects developed despite 
the stance of parts of the state. These contrasts allow us to see why similar places 
produce different social economy ventures and why different places produce similar 
social economies. 
 
 
Summarising the evidence: four key findings  
 
The main findings of the three research projects may be summarised as follows. 
First, empirical evidence shatters the illusion that there are model social enterprises 
or models of best practice that can be unproblematically transplanted and 
encouraged through standardised “one size fits all” policy interventions.  What counts 
as success varies enormously between initiatives, with achievements such as 
enhancing client-confidence and participation often at odds with national policy 
expectations measured in terms of specific quantifiable short-term outcomes relating 
to jobs and training, medium to long-term financial sustainability and, less precisely, 
local economic ‘regeneration’.  A corollary of this is that place and ‘local’ context are 
of importance in determining the nature and ‘success’ of social economy initiatives.  
For example, the supportive role of the local authority in Glasgow within a specific 
Labourist political culture has had significant effects on the emergent form of the 
social economy there, and upon its ‘success’. In contrast, in a similar industrial and 
social setting in Middlesbrough, a different state practice has resulted in a more 
modest social economy. In contrast, in Bristol a long history of voluntary sector 
activity, community activism, civic engagement and alternative lifestyles has helped 
underpin a vibrant social economy while in the valleys of the former south Wales 
coalfield, a vibrant social economy has developed in spite of opposition from parts of 
the state, notably some Local Authorities. In short, ‘success’ is a product of a range 
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of place-specific factors as processes that cannot be assumed to exist or to be 
capable of being induced elsewhere.  
 
Second, the evidence demonstrates that the social economy cannot be 
conceptualised without reference to the state or the mainstream market.  Often it 
remains highly dependent upon the state in a range of ways.  Although there are 
examples of projects that have successfully developed independently of public funds, 
the majority of social enterprises (even well known “success stories”) rely heavily on 
grant income and/or service level contracts with public authorities.  The idea that 
social enterprises should be able to trade their way out of state dependency, whilst 
commonplace, sits uneasily with the experience of existing projects in the UK.  The 
alternative that the social economy offers with respect to the public sector, therefore, 
is less one of providing a different way of generating resources than one of a different 
way of using and distributing them.  The relationship between the social economy 
and the private sector is also significant, albeit precarious and uneven.  In places 
where the private sector economy is strong, such as in London and Bristol, the social 
economy has been able to derive considerable benefits from its relationships with it.  
These include the secondment of staff from local firms, the acquisition of materials 
and financial donations, and the capacity of local labour markets to absorb people 
(re)trained through the social economy.  Where the private sector economy is much 
weaker, as in deindustrialised urban areas and former coalfields, such links cannot 
develop because there are simply too few private sector firms to provide sufficient 
opportunities for such linkages to emerge and be sustained.  
 
Third, therefore, contrary to dominant communitarian and Third Way thought, that the 
evidence strongly indicates that the social economy is rarely genuinely rooted in the 
resources of local communities.  Indeed, areas of marked social exclusion and 
deprivation (as is clearly shown by data from the Index of Multiple Deprivation, 2000) 
are often precisely those that lack the requisite skills and resources necessary to 
sustain a vibrant social economy. Instead, the fledgling social economy in such 
places comprises either highly precarious and short-lived ventures that fail to meet 
local needs or ventures reliant upon public sector leadership, peripatetic 
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professionals and social entrepreneurs, dedicated organisations such as religious or 
minority ethnic bodies, or market links that stretch well beyond the limited 
opportunities available locally.  The presence of the local community, and extent of its 
participation, seems to depend upon two factors. First, the nature of the local 
community itself (for example, is it cohesive, self-identifying, active?) and, secondly, 
the extent to which and ways in which social enterprises engage with local people 
(for example, is there genuine and persistent commitment to empowerment and 
involvement?).   
 
Fourth, on the basis of the evidence, it is naïve and unreasonable to expect, as does 
UK policy and increasingly also EU thinking, that the social economy can be a major 
source of jobs, entrepreneurship, local regeneration, and welfare provision.  To do 
so, runs the risk of marked disappointment as a result of unrealised expectations, a 
return to the vagaries of ‘good acts’ and ‘good people’ in combating social exclusion, 
tackling poverty and meeting welfare needs, and legitimating cuts in state 
expenditure or state remit and responsibilities.  More positively, there is evidence that 
social enterprises - in the right places and with the relevant support - have a role to 
play that is complementary to provision via state and market.  As such, they can 
achieve something genuinely different.  The more successful social enterprises 
opened up new possibilities and networks for people who had previously been 
confined to the limited resources of poor places.  This is not simply a question of 
altering poor people in poor places so that they become more like the rest of people 
in the ‘socially included’ world. Instead, it is a question of opening up and sustaining 
new ways of being; new sources of fulfilling and participatory work, providing socially 
useful goods and services, or practising ethical and ecological values.  In this way, 
the alterity of the social economy can potentially transform the mainstream.  This is 
most obvious when the social economy provides targeted services in a non-
bureaucratic and ‘hands on’ way, or when projects have been able to alter political 
relationships within local communities – creating both new forms of democratic 
participation and economic opportunity.  Therefore, Third Way/New Labour thinking, 
which charges social enterprises with creating jobs, tackling social exclusion in the 
round, providing training, developing local services and local markets and generally 
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countering the effects of years of disinvestment and disengagement by public and 
private sectors alike, is seriously wide of the mark.  
 
 
From evidence to policy Issues: three issues 
 
Influences on Performance 
 
Given the variety of experience in the social economy, there is little or noting to be 
gained from seeking universally valid factors that cut across varied initiatives.  It is, 
however, legitimate to ask if there is a shared set of influences that recurrently exert 
a decisive impact on the performance of individual initiatives.  Five factors can be 
identified that have clear implications for what might be considered as the framework 
conditions necessary for a vibrant social economy. 
 
The first concerns the quality of leadership of social entrepreneurs and 
intermediaries.  Evidence of the involvement of communities and the socially 
excluded in establishing initiatives and in driving their success has been most notable 
by its absence.  Given the complex privations of skill, know-how, capability, and 
confidence, which mark the socially excluded, this is not surprising.  The successful 
ventures have in general been driven by committed professionals, experienced social 
entrepreneurs, community activists, and ethical leaders (for example in religious or 
environmental movements).  Many are extraordinary individuals who have foregone 
the option of lucrative careers, and who possess a complex array of skills and 
abilities, to mobilise resources, motivate people, identify under-met needs, make 
contacts, think laterally, and grasp opportunities.  They have been described as ‘the 
research and development wing of the welfare system, innovating new solutions to 
intractable social problems’ (Leadbeater, 1997: 8).  They are, at best, leaders and 
visionaries, and if not this, at a minimum highly professional in their approach to 
social enterprises as business ventures.   
 
The second, and related, factor is clarity of goal.  Many initiatives flounder because of 
a lack of a clear sense of mission, and for that reason, fail to align processes with 
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aims. Typically, initiatives mixing business-driven aspirations and 
cohesion/empowerment goals but lacking a clear-cut and conscious understanding of 
the differences between them, have had to sacrifice one or the other or have come 
unstuck and fallen between two stools because of contradictory organisational 
arrangements.  For example, ethical ventures have been forced to lower wages or 
the quality of training because the product is commercially non-viable, or business-
driven ventures have been forced by funding agencies to change direction because 
of poor social achievements.  This kind of elision played a part in the decline of the 
community business movement in Scotland.  In contrast, the experience of initiatives 
with clear aims has been different.  Those with cohesion and empowerment as the 
main goal have consciously organised work, clients and products as a means of 
meeting needs or developing capabilities, which, in turn, has focused effort.  
Similarly, business-driven ventures run by professionals, as for example has become 
the trend in Glasgow, are clear that equity must follow business success, perhaps 
even at the expense of social objectives.   
 
Third, success is unambiguously related to systematic and careful market research.  
Initiatives that have failed or are struggling to survive are characterised by poor 
quality products and services, with restricted demand for them or strong competition 
from other outlets.  Only too often they have been born out of a response to a highly 
localised problem, without analysis of the potential for sustained demand.  In 
contrast, successful ventures – either ethically or business-driven – offer a unique 
product, a unique selling point with potential beyond the local economy, and in 
markets of secondary interest to mainstream private sector firms or public welfare 
organisations.  Typical niches include art materials for childcare organisations, 
recycled furniture for low-income groups, low-budget catering, shopping catalogues 
distributed by the homeless, and targeted services for ethnic minorities or particular 
disadvantaged groups.  In all the cases, real under-met social needs have been 
identified, with potential for expansion beyond the immediate neighbourhood and/or 
into related services.  However, in some instances, the local state has played an 
important role in underwriting demand as a contractor of the services provided.  This 
highlights the point that for survival, beyond the important question of choosing the 
right product, there is a pressing need to secure a source of recurring demand. This 
presents a considerable challenge for small social enterprises with fragile market 
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expertise and thinly spread competencies.   
 
The fourth factor is the intermediation of risk.  The limited resources of social 
enterprises are typically stretched to the full. Often this is because of limited business 
expertise, relative isolation from circuits of information, services, expertise, and 
finance, and the lack of involvement on the part of their client-groups and 
communities that are typically characterised by severe shortages of social capital and 
material deprivation.  This insecurity is intensified by the culture of short-termism and 
bureaucracy that characterises public funding for the social economy in the UK.  
Frequently voiced complaints included: the absence of medium-term funding, 
unnecessary paper-work and red-tape, evaluations based primarily on quantified 
outputs (for example, number of jobs), intrusive monitoring of performance, 
partnership with other organisations as a funding requirement, and more generally, 
short-termism and frequently changing fashions in regeneration policy.  In contrast, 
more successful initiatives seem to have benefited from sensitive risk mediation of 
different kinds.  Firstly, funding sensitive to the social targets of the initiatives, 
recognising the need to balance social objectives such as empowerment, advocacy, 
capacity-building and the creation of trust and social capital in its various forms (for 
example, see  Harper, 2002; Performance and Innovation Unit, 2002), with 
quantitative measures of success; recognising the time and resource difficulties 
posed by an audit-based funding culture; and providing financial latitude for product 
or process innovation, and, if necessary, failure.  Secondly, intermediation itself, in 
the form of conscious effort by enterprises to involve clients and employees, and 
importantly, the possibility of regular networking among social entrepreneurs and 
social economy professionals.  Finally, an attitude of recognition and partnership, 
within the local state, which continues to play a critical role in funding, enabling, and 
contracting services to the social economy, rather than prescription or distance, has 
made a difference in terms of the access of initiatives to possibilities and support. 
 
The fifth factor influencing performance – in many ways an obvious one – is the 
proximity of initiatives to mainstream economic dynamism.  This affects both supply 
and demand conditions.  Social enterprises based in or close to areas of economic 
prosperity have undoubtedly benefited from better market opportunities, linked to a 
higher and more varied elasticity of demand.  There is greater scope for niche 
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products, sustained by a more varied pattern of consumer expenditure.  On the 
supply side, the market for funding in prosperous areas is potentially more 
specialised, affording scope for socially-based investment ventures. Furthermore, the 
higher level of churning in the labour market appears to attract, a more varied and 
experienced set of professionals, employees and clients into the social economy, 
even if only temporarily and for short periods. Thus 8.5% of the working population in 
London are involved with social enterprises, whereas in north east England this figure 
falls to 5.4% (Harding and Cowing, 2004) 
 
How place matters 
 
The positive correlation between the strength of social enterprises and the local 
mainstream economy poses an interesting dilemma for current policy, which 
proposes the social economy as a solution for the economically most marginalised 
areas.  UK government policies (manifest in the recommendations of the Social 
Exclusion Unit, new welfare programmes, and neighbourhood regeneration policies) 
have come to equate the social economy with social exclusion, through the 
superficial observation that both phenomena are somehow ‘local’.  The localised 
manifestation of social exclusion in its varied forms (for example, in ‘sink’ social 
housing estates and deindustrialised inner cities and coalfields) is increasingly read 
as evidence of the local causes of exclusion (for example, ghetto cultures, spirals of 
multiple deprivation, local pathologies of life on the margins).  As a corollary there 
has been diminishing recognition of wider causes, such as the socio-spatial biases of 
national welfare and competitiveness policies, the multi-dimensional positional 
weaknesses of particular groups in society, and opportunity structures adversely 
affected by international economic circumstances and intensifying competition in a 
globalising economy.  This has legitimated a shift to area-based solutions, including 
various sorts of community-based schemes incorporating the social economy, on the 
grounds that social enterprises are supposed to use local resources to respond to 
local needs.  While it is recognised that the strength of the social economy varies 
from place to place, the logic of the new thinking is that a crystallisation of best 
practice from the experiences of the most successful ventures can help to eradicate 
‘local impediments’ and produce generalised and transferable models of ‘success’.  
Local potential can be realised, if cleansed of local noise.   
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 In contrast, I argue that the social economy is the product of local social context, 
which is precisely why it is so varied from place to place.  However, and this is 
crucial, social context and place are not reducible to one another.  In contrast, the 
character of society-in-place (not society-as-place) is central, allowing initiatives 
varied geographies of local and global connectivity. Context matters - not as social 
context reduced to particular types of place (for example, low or high trust 
environments, spaces of face-to-face familiarity, powers of community; circuits of 
local need) but in terms of how the social economy is locally instantiated, Thus, for 
example, there were very few examples of social enterprise rooted in community or 
local social capital, and few examples of success confined to local circuits of supply, 
connectivity, and provision.  In Glasgow, the most enterprising initiatives have sought 
national markets, while the new culture of business professionalism in the 
governance of the sector is not reducible to ‘local culture’.  Similarly, in Bristol, Tower 
Hamlets and the valleys of south Wales, opportunities have arisen as a result of 
peripatetic professionals and mobile standards, together with connections into the 
wider formal economy.  Local commitment, and the response to local needs has not 
depended solely on local resources, nor, ironically, on local society. Place has 
mattered as a site of network connections. Elsewhere, in contrast, for example in 
Middlesbrough, such connections have been largely absent and the local social 
economy has of necessity relied on local links and capabilities.  In neither case, 
however, can the ‘local’ be seen as pre-given in its character or scope.   
 
Local context has influenced the shape of the social economy primarily as an 
institutional setting with its own peculiar history and character.  Discussion of 
influences on the performance of individual social enterprises should be sensitive to 
this aspect of place.  For example, in depleted communities and drastically hollowed 
out neighbourhoods, where capabilities on the ground have been tested to – and 
often pushed beyond - the limit by poverty and alienation, the role of the state and 
top-down support in general, has become crucial.  Elsewhere, in Bristol and Tower 
Hamlets, the presence of an active third sector, instituted cultural variety and an 
ethical fraction of the middle class, has played a determining role.  The ‘instanciation’ 
of the social economy – successful or otherwise – has occurred in and through this 
institutional context.  Six aspects of local context appear to have played an important 
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part in nurturing the formation of a vibrant and relatively independent social economy.  
In no order of importance, these include, first, what might be described as the 
presence of voiced minority cultures expressing non-mainstream needs and values.  
The presence, for instance, in different doses and mixes, of outreach artists, 
environmentalists, New Age groups, yeoman values, women’s groups, ethnic 
minority demands, Quaker, Methodist or other ethical organisations committed to 
social empowerment, has helped to legitimate and support bottom-up initiatives 
designed to meet social needs or harness alternative economic values (for example, 
fair trade, reciprocity, profit-sharing).   
 
A second and partly related aspect is associational presence, or what Evans (2001) 
describes as, in the context of the US and France, a market for welfare 
intermediaries situated between the state and private sector.  These intermediaries 
are not simply third sector organisations but agencies like BACEN in Bristol that have 
emerged to handle contracted-out state welfare services, and act as advocates for 
social enterprises, as a search engine for information, resources, and opportunities, 
and provide a contact base within and beyond the sector.  The absence of local 
associations is not only an impediment to mobilisation and interest representation 
within the social economy, but also skews the balance of power in favour of 
mainstream organisations with only a passing or instrumentalist interest in the social 
economy. 
 
The third aspect, the behaviour of the local state, exemplifies the significance of this 
inter-institutional balance.  In contexts of limited local institutional pluralism such as 
Glasgow and Middlesbrough, the state, with the help of outreach career 
professionals, has exercised a major influence, pursuing a particular model of the 
social economy, but in which it can claim no special expertise.  This has led to 
modest outputs, and/or a fairly predictable alignment of the social economy to small 
business formation or intermediate labour market goals.  In contrast, in settings of 
greater civic activism and institutional heterogeneity such as Tower Hamlets and 
Bristol, local authorities have become more reflexive about the range of possibilities 
as well as their own role.  While at times this has threatened the prospect of 
insufficient action, at other times, as Putnam (1993) asserts in the context of regions 
rich in social capital, it has stimulated an openness to difference, and a willingness to 
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support, rather than direct, the independent effort of social enterprises.   
 
As a consequence, a fourth influence on the social economy relates to the scope for 
agonism (Mouffe, 2000) in the local political culture.  An agonistic political sphere 
accepts difference and seeks agreement through vigorous discussion between 
declared opposed interests.  It does not seek consensus at the price of suppression 
of plural and minority interests, but looks for a commons constructed out of debate 
and disagreement, and a democracy based on the right of presence of diverse 
interests.  Such a political culture – evident in part in one of our case cities (Bristol) – 
can be vital for the social economy, for two reasons. First, because it affords space to 
what is normally considered a minority economic activity. Secondly, because it 
accepts the legitimacy of economic (as well as social and political) experimentation 
and novelty.  Related to this openness is a readiness to avoid a politics of place 
based on local turf wars around a regressive local sense of place (for example, a 
culture of ‘we have always done it this way’, or ‘our field of engagement ends at the 
city boundary’).  Instead, it seeks to embrace a politics in place that draws on a wider 
field of connections, resources and ideas (to vitalise the social economy in 
imaginative ways, among other things). 
 
Thus, a fifth aspect of place that is of significance is connectivity. Bristol and Tower 
Hamlets are places of socio-economic mobility and external linkage.  This is manifest 
in different ways, including the to-and-fro between work and employment, informal 
meetings between social entrepreneurs and activists, the presence of peripatetic 
professionals, strong ‘movement’ links beyond the locality, juxtaposition with 
opportunities in the formal economy, and linkage between communities, local 
authorities, and intermediaries.  These localities resemble networked sites, able to 
reach widely and draw in resources to sustain the social economy, rather than 
clusters of activity such as those in Glasgow and Middlesbrough, which lack lateral 
connectivity or are characterised by connections established and/or appropriated by 
the state.   
 
Finally, however, underpinning all of the above is the degree of local socio-economic 
deprivation.  There can be little doubt that the differences observed among between 
varied cities and coalfield areas are linked to the depth and scale of deprivation (for 
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example, see Alcock et al, 2003).  Places with large-scale and structural 
unemployment in a context of limited labour market vitality, evacuation of civil society, 
and reduced social and class heterogeneity, offer a severely restricted resource and 
opportunity base for social enterprise.  The excluded are least equipped to 
participate, and the institutional base to facilitate integration is deficient, thin and 
underdeveloped.  The situation is very different in places of relative prosperity, labour 
market churning, and socio-cultural heterogeneity, where the range of available 
opportunities is broader, as is the base for sustaining economic variety.   
 
The above six aspects of place overlap, in some senses, with the influences on 
individual performance identified above.  The key point, however, is that the 
characteristics of place are not reducible to the latter, and, as a set of attributes that 
contribute to the culture of a place, they add an important dimension to the nature 
and scope of the social economy in different locations.  In this sense, current policy 
sensitivity to place in combating social exclusion is correct.  However, this sensitivity, 
as already suggested, takes the form of a stereotyping of both the type of places that 
suffer social exclusion and the requisite (social economy) solutions, rather than an 
awareness of the powers and constraints of context.  In addition, the policy focus is 
primarily on individual-level interventions, rather than on the collective, and at times 
less tangible, aspects of place that are of significance.  Yet, any committed attempt to 
build the social economy needs to take these aspects seriously. 
 
What kind of social economy for whom? 
 
The fundamental question that remains, however, is what do we want the social 
economy for?  Currently, at least three normative positions are evident, linked, 
respectively, to state welfare reform, business enterprise, and the economy of needs.   
 
Regarding the first position, much contemporary policy interest in the social 
economy, and not just in the UK, is driven by concerns to reform and rein in the 
welfare state.  Social enterprises have been welcomed as labour market 
intermediaries, facilitating the re-entry of the socially excluded into employment, not 
least because they are potentially resource-efficient and allegedly close to 
‘communities’.  They are also seen as a way of contracting out to third sector 
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organisations services traditionally offered by the welfare state, thereby reducing the 
cost to the state of welfare provision, and through this, normalising a new culture of 
(cut-price) welfare pluralism.  There is an odd consensus emerging between ‘Third 
Way’ politicians interested in efficiency of delivery and reduced state 
expenditure/dependency and social economy advocates thrilled by the prospect of 
becoming co-producers of welfare services, ‘putting the public back into public 
service’2.  Finally, the rhetoric of spatial targeting has become a way of posing the 
social economy, through its varied powers ranging from the offer of work and 
services to empowerment and community/capability-building, as a – if not the - 
means of combating social exclusion, now pathologised as the problem of particular 
types of people in particular types of location. This amounts to a subtle abandonment 
of the universal welfare state, under the guise of partnership, efficiency of service 
delivery and targeting.   
 
The third sector, and specifically social enterprises can certainly have an important 
role in welfare provision because of their expertise, knowledge and commitment.  
However, this emphatically should not be a role of state welfare substitution.  The 
experiences of the last decade reveal a somewhat sorry tale of patchy and limited 
success in the social economy, hampered in many instances by poor funding, 
stretched resources, erratic and modest quality services, and limited survival 
prospects.  It also tells the story of social enterprises simply plastering over the 
cracks of composite welfare deprivation in places of long-term decline, unable 
adequately to respond to need, sustain provision, and, most importantly, re-build 
capabilities.  In this context, it is not hard to conclude that the social economy risks 
going full circle back into the 19th Century, again becoming a poor form of welfare for 
the poor, while the welfare state realigns itself to reproduce those most economically 
useful, now and in the future, in some places and not in others.   
 
The evident and visible risk is of the end of one nation politics, and the end of a one-
nation welfare society, legitimated by a hot-spot geography of social exclusion that 
rarely finds its causes and solutions within the named places.  To avoid this prospect 
– although it is arguably already too late on the UK and USA (Hudson and Williams, 
                                                          
3. To borrow a phrase from Ed Mayo of the New Economics Foundation, in a presentation to a conference 
launching The UK Social Economy Coalition, 31 May 2001, London 
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1995) - requires a continuation of a welfare culture of complementary support through 
the social economy (funded properly by the state) within a framework, as in the 
Scandinavian countries, of active state measures offering work opportunities to the 
excluded, and welfare schemes of high quality designed to meet the needs and build 
the capabilities of all, and not just the few.   
 
The second normative expectation from the social economy arises from the ethos of 
enterprise and business now inculcated in the spirit of neoliberalism running through 
the full spectrum of organised life.  This emphasis has grown within the sector itself 
as a means of selling social enterprises to government and other sponsors, but also 
as a means of legitimating social enterprise as a market-driven, revenue-seeking, 
venture.  There is growing unease about the negative connotations of labels such as 
‘not-for-profit’, ‘community-business’, or ‘needs before profit’.  This shift has occurred 
as a result of the perception – clearly evident in the case of Scotland - that old style 
community initiatives were not run as proper businesses (for example, they were 
seen as characterised by poor product viability, no business expertise, lack of 
organisation, etc.) and therefore failed to survive or grow.  The shift is also related to 
a new sense that commercial and social objectives can be reconciled, otherwise the 
reputation of social enterprises will remain that of ‘small, undercapitalised, 
commercially precarious enterprises providing a limited number of poorly-paid, low-
skilled jobs that are funded as an arm of social policy’. Consequently, ‘If community 
business is to make a significant contribution then there is a need to adopt a more 
targeted development approach which could result in the setting up of a number of 
exemplar businesses that are commercially viable and are involved in mainstream 
competitive markets’ (Hayton, 2000: 204-5).  Hayton goes on to recommend policy 
reforms to improve the business development skills of social entrepreneurs, recruit 
board-members from the private sector, target support across the life of a business, 
and focus on targets such as increases in turnover and trading surpluses.  However, 
as Bowring (1999) notes, envisioning the social economy through the lens of neo-
liberalism runs the risk of reproducing the inequalities of the mainstream economy 
into the space of the social economy.  
 
Social enterprises should certainly not become sites of economic misery or poor 
professional practice, but the extent to which they can – and should - be seen as just 
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another (mainstream) market venture is much more contentious and problematic.  
What supposedly makes them distinct from commercial firms is their commitment to 
social empowerment and to meeting social needs.  Commercial firms are in part 
successful as businesses because of the absence of such a commitment, which 
allows them to organise in order to maximise profit and revenue to shareholders.  
Jobs and job-satisfaction are a by-product, not the prime goal.  Conversely, social 
enterprises might fail as businesses precisely because their prime social obligations 
– which require care, spending time with clients, investing resources in people, 
involvement in the community – conflict with the requirements for market efficiency 
and market-driven product viability.  In short, their failure as social enterprises may 
be largely a consequence of being forced to become commercial businesses in order 
to survive, in ways that compromise their original social objectives.  When sponsors 
have not evaluated ventures on strict commercial criteria, and when there is a degree 
of financial security provided by funding agencies, the scope to develop as 
enterprises with a social remit has been considerably enhanced. 
 
Few social enterprises have managed to develop niche products with sustainable or 
growing demand. When they have, public sector support has not been far away.  This 
raises the question of whether it is realistic to assume that the majority of social 
enterprises can become commercial enterprises, even with the kind of support 
Hayton recommends.  The challenges that they face in terms of the capabilities of the 
communities in which they are based, their severe resource, know-how, and size 
constraints, and the inelasticity of demand in their immediate local market, place 
them at the very margins of potential business viability.  They are constrained by 
local circumstances and usually lack the resources to connect into wider networks.  
In this context, current claims as to the possibilities of commercial viability and 
business potential seems somewhat fanciful, a dangerous distraction from the main 
purpose of social enterprises.  A more sensible alternative, especially in areas of 
marked deprivation and isolation from economic opportunity, might be the renewal of 
committed effort by the state to increase job opportunities through incentives to 
attract the private sector or through public sector programmes, instead of passing 
responsibility on to the social economy.   
 
It is the alterity of the social economy from the mainstream, rooted in the economy of 
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needs, which offers the greatest potential for the future (Amin et al, 2003).  In 
societies increasingly dominated by the market as the resource allocation 
mechanism, accompanied by waning state provision, the state-business 
rapprochement on economic organisation for competitiveness and consumerism is 
increasing the distance between the imperatives of the market and the idea of 
economic organisation as directed towards meeting social needs, fostering social 
solidarity, and developing human capabilities.  Marx famously summarised this 
contrast as the opposition between production for exchange-value and production for 
use-value.  Today, the dislocation is leaving vast sections of society without adequate 
welfare provision, under-met needs, a limited role as producers in the context of 
jobless growth, and alienation from full-citizenship in the context of entrapment in 
ghettos of social exclusion.  And, the twist is that the pervasive reach of exchange-
value society makes it ever more difficult to imagine and legitimate non-market forms 
of organisation and provision.  The above-mentioned normative elision of ethics, 
needs, and market performance in the social enterprise of the future is symptomatic 
of this turn.   
 
Yet what has marked the success and energy of such varied enterprises as the Arts 
Factory, Gabalfa, Matson, Sofa, Reclaim, FRC, Account 3, the Bridge Project, and 
the Bromley-by-Bow Centre is precisely their difference, and the legitimacy they give 
to the possibility of a different kind of economy.  It is this that defines the third 
normative position. They are driven by an ethical commitment to empowerment and 
the welfare/developmental needs of marginalised groups, and it is through this 
commitment that such social enterprises have fashioned products and services that 
are ‘market’ viable.  Beyond this, some of those involved in these projects see what 
they do as advocacy for another way of life; one based on social commitment, 
ethical/environmental citizenship, and work as a vehicle for self and social 
enhancement.  They have a clear sense of why they merit the label social enterprise, 
and they are part of a wider social desire for an alternative to a society driven by the 
imperatives of the market and private capital accumulation.   
 
 
Conclusions 
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 It is this clear sense of being part of a wider social desire for a meaningful alternative 
to a capitalist market-dominated society that constitutes the real strength of the social 
economy.  It will never become an economic growth machine or an engine of mass 
job generation and it should not be seen as a replacement for the welfare state. 
However, it can signify the possibilities of another way and constitute a small symbol 
of another kind of economy, one based on meeting social needs and enhancing 
social citizenship. Indeed, it might transcend its current limits if the policy-driven 
conception of the social economy as a ‘localised’ solution to the problem of ‘local’ 
social exclusion could be broken. For while this legitimates variety in the forms that 
the social economy can take in different places, it also rules out consideration of 
systemic alternatives to the mainstream capitalist economy. Maybe the key move, 
therefore, is to break the localised link between the social economy and social 
exclusion. This would require ‘de-localising’ and ’de-scaling’ discourses around the 
social economy and challenging the dominant conception of the mainstream rather 
than seeking to cast the social economy in its mould or to see it as filling the 
interstices that the mainstream has abandoned. 
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